Abstract: The December, 2014 announcement by Raúl Castro and President Barack Obama regarding the "thaw" of the US-Cuba diplomatic relations opens up new possibilities. Sport, specifically baseball, represents an area of opportunity for the rapprochement of both countries. MLB baseball is increasingly dependent on the inflow of foreign talent, especially on Latin American players. The status of the Cuban player is peculiar and it could normalize as a result of the full normalization of the diplomatic relations. This paper analyzes the economic incentives as well as the existing legal challenges in the US-Cuba interdependent relationship. Finally, the argument suggests that baseball could pave the way for a constructivist approach of other specific US-Cuba relationships, partially replacing the high politics that has dominated the bilateral relationship for more than five decades.
Introduction
Different interpretations can be made around the December 17, 2014 announcement made by President Barack Obama's and Raúl Catro's announcement, in which they communicated their intention to normalize and re-establish diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States of America. This paper begins with an attempt to explain, theoretically, the thawing of the bilateral US-Cuban relations. A second section discusses what is considered a wide range of bilateral relations between the two countries. It also explains the reason that leads the author to focus on baseball as "the" relationship of study. That relationship, as argued, requires an analysis of the different actors (and interests) involved in baseball. The third section examines the way in which Major League Baseball (MLB) can serve as a formidable set of individuals and groups of interest around baseball and how this (not necessarily interstate) transnational social microcosm, could contribute to a truly revolutionary transformation of the relations between the two states. To achieve this, it is necessary to take into account the political economy of baseball. The fourth section seeks to explain the social, political, economic, and cultural significance that baseball has, first to Cuba and second, that of Cuban Baseball to MLB. The fifth section deals with the concrete (or potential) role that MLB has in the politics of both the thaw and the normalization of diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba.
The sixth section gets a head start on what could be some of the implications of the normalization of diplomatic relations in the specific social microcosm called baseball, as well as its potential links and impacts on other relationships between both countries. The final section explains the novel way in which baseball could become an efficient constructivist tool and a catalyst for a reset in the Cuban-U.S. transnational relations.
Theoretical explanations of the thaw of Cuba-United States relations.
To a large extent, during several decades, the U.S. relationship with Cuba was marked (perhaps it remains so by the inertia) by two realities: the political-economic context of the Cold War on the one hand, and intellectually, by the dominance of realist thought in International Relations.
Today, when realist tenets 1 usefulness is generally limited to the policy among the great powers (Mearsheimer 2001) , other approaches (Mingst 2004; Wendt 2009; Zehfuss 2009) seem to be required to explain both the rapprochement of the US with Cuba and to analyze the possible paths of a relationship that seems to be in the process of normalization.
Karen Mingst (2004) reminds us that there are three models for decision making: 1) the rational model; (2) the organizational/bureaucratic model, and 3) the pluralist model. The first implies either a monopoly on decision-making through the rational-unitarian state, or at least a very important degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state versus other players. When this model dominates, it is normal to talk about the relationship that a given state has with its counterparts. That is the case especially because the diversity and complexity of the relations tend to be read through the lenses of a unitarian state policy. The second model involves decisions deriving from organizations or sub-national bureaucracies, but there is no denial of the dominance of state actors, although many sub-state actors are taken into account. The third model is particularly useful for the present paper, since it presents a perspective that transcends the realist domain. As Karen Mingst claims, when she refers to the pluralist model "... in contrast to the other two alternatives, attributes decisions to bargaining conducted among domestic sources-the public, interest groups, mass movements, and multinational corporations" (Mingst 2004, 126) .
President Obama seems to understand that engagement is the key to spread American values in Cuba rather that the isolation of the island. Obama said: "I believe that we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement. After all, these 50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It's time for a new approach." (Obama 2014 ).
Contrary to the initial optimism that "the announcement" has generated, there is fear among those who consider that the U.S.-Cuban "rapprochement" could mean a return to realpolitik. Perhaps the logic of such fear, stems from the possibility of a further weakening of a country such as Cuba, which currently does not represent a serious challenge to U.S.
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. According to those supporting this fear, the change of strategies does not seem to nullify per se the contents or philosophical tenets of realism.
In this line of thought, and certainly not coming from an academic background, the bullpen coach of the Pittsburgh Pirates, Euclides Rojas, foresees changes coming along with the thaw:
"engagement seems the best way, to infect, then kill the beast."(quoted in Price 2014, 116) .
In the present analysis, it is difficult to overlook the realist prevalence, so present and dominant within American foreign policy logic. Experience dictates that in situations of conflict, in cases in which the defense and security of the country seem "in check", the capabilities of the state and its absolute or relative power, versus other states, are decisive;
however, there is room to think that there is a variety of international actors besides the states, and there is no "evident" reason to believe that there can only exist a single relationship, USCuba. From the perspective of this paper, it is wrong to think that only the realist approach is present or is the only motivator in the development of the relationship. Even within the realist logic, the economy, which is a pre-requisite for a state's strength, requires the participation of economic agents. The economics of baseball could shed light on the possible paths during the normalization period. The understanding of the political economy of baseball opens the possibility of incorporating a variety of state, sub-state, non-governmental, and individual actors to make sense of the normalization and the possible future of the bilateral relationship.
From the perspective of this work, the political economy approach does not necessarily have to lead us back to political realism. It could be useful as a guideline for a "reset", which is certainly not post-realist, but which could coexist with realism. It could also mean the acknowledgement of the existence of multiple relations, state-based as well as transnational, anchored in the promise of the tenets of constructivism.
Analysis of actors and interested parties involved in baseball.
Despite the nationalist-instrumental use that sport has experienced throughout history, and which ultimate expression can be seen in the national medal counts, we shall not forget that the majority of sports, in the majority of countries, are neither a function, nor a competency, or even the property of states. This reality obliges us to take into account the various sport stakeholders and their respective interests.
Beyond the national teams, sports take roots in individuals, groups (teams) and the associations of groups (leagues). At given times (Barcelona 1992 -2008 , baseball has turned into a competition scenario among national squads within the Olympic Games or more recently in the form of the World Baseball Classic (since 2006). On the other hand, the flows of individuals, and their economic-sport impact on teams and leagues shows a tremendous continuity, much more evident than the one that baseball has as a confrontation domain between national representations.
It is worth noting that, despite baseball having greater implications for individuals, teams, and leagues, the three considered as economic units, than the implications it has for countries, the possibilities of playing professionally is to a great extent an activity that cannot be divorced from, and indeed is closely linked with the "high politics" of the states. Therefore, the possibilities are oftentimes constrained by the political and legal conditions that states dictate.
The classic work of Simon Rottenberg (1956) already warned about certain peculiarities that made baseball a non-perfect player's market. Among these peculiarities it is possible to mention the existing "labour agreements" between teams from the major leagues and the minor leagues, ''territorial rights'' of teams, "standardized contracts", tampering (the impossibility that a team has to negotiate with another team while the player in which it is interested has a contract with another team). Essential from the standpoint of this work is that in the mid-20th century, "most of the revenue of baseball clubs in baseball comes from admission receipts" (Rottenberg 1956, 246) . While revenues from tickets accounted for 74.1% of revenues, television and radio rights represented only 10.5% (Rottenberg 1956, 246 ). In the mid-50s of the 20th century, baseball captured a quarter (25.1%) of viewers of professional sports (Rottenberg 1956, 246 They also argue that some of the benefits that teams expect to get from a player, in addition to the number of years that the player plays for the team, are: "directly more wins and indirectly in higher ticket and TV revenues" (Shepherd and Shepherd 2003, 5) .
Scott Tainsky and Jason Winfree (2010) found evidence that the presence of every foreign player will generate $595 632 in ticket sales. By 2010, the average MLB team roster had 10.78 foreign players (Tainsky and Winfree 2010, 127 3. The MLB: a business increasingly dependent on foreign baseball players.
In order to understand the MLB as a key player in the thaw and the normalization of U.S.-Cuba bilateral state relations, it is necessary to understand basic principles of the political economy of baseball.
Arturo Marcano and David Fidler (1999) observed a series of parallels between large multinational corporations (MNC) and the MLB: 1) both involve a consumer market in other countries and 2) both look for access to global markets of talent and/or work. If we admit the idea that there are scarce goods, we can then understand the double and complex relationship, both of dependence and interdependence, of the MLB with and within the system that the MLB and its component parts form. Shepherd and Shepherd (2003) noted that while in the decade of the 40s of the 20th century, there was only a "handful of foreign players 2 ", by the first decade of the 21st century, more than 40% of major league and minor league players were born outside the United States.
Foreigners, especially latinos, account for more than 25% of starting players in the MLB.
Shepherd and Shepherd (2003) Additionally, there were 27 players born in Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Puerto Rico, which gives an idea of the growing influence of Latin players in the MLB. Marcano and Fidler (1999) suggest that one of the implications of such a controversial concept, such as globalization, is the notion of denationalization. When referring to the MLB, they observe that denationalization is precisely the hallmark of baseball towards the end of the 20th century.
The 1994 MLB strike marked a watershed in the history of the League; therefore, I
consider important to link the profitability of the MLB with the boom of the foreign players market after the season-ending strike. This boom has extended for over two decades now. According to the perspective of this paper, it is not only the lower average cost of the acquisition of Latin American baseball player which explains their boom in the MLB. It is also related to the geographic proximity, as well as with the demographic characteristics of the United States. Its significant Latin population likes to follow the performance of players coming from their countries of origin. The quality of foreign players in general, and Latinos in particular, is illustrated in the following table. Although the dependence of the MLB on foreign players occurs mainly with respect to Latin players, this dependence increasingly becomes global. Marcano and Fidler (1999) report that MLB is seen in 215 countries, either through ESPN or through local media companies. They also add that when a foreign player happens to be very popular in his country of origin, it is much more likely for the MLB to sell broadcast rights to the player's country of origin. Marcano and Fidler consider that the existence of a mature market in the United States has forced the MLB to make inroads into new markets. Japan, the country that won the two first World Baseball Classics is an undisputed source of baseball talent, which incidentally serves a very important domestic market. In contrast to what happens with the Latin American and Cuban markets, it presents certain peculiarities that make it difficult to hire the services of Japanese players (Piehl 2010) . The MLB now is forced to compete internationally for scarce talent, which today more than ever before, is disperse in different geographical areas. As Matthew Piehl (2010) points out, the MLB faces a series of restrictions trying to gain access to Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) players.
It is clear that the MLB increasingly depends on foreign baseball players both for profitability purposes as well as a result of the shortage of domestic baseball talent. Although the Latin American players have become fundamental, Canadian, Japanese and South Korean players, among others, are gaining relevance, not only on the field, but also as a spare head for the opening of international markets for the MLB.
The meaning of baseball to Cuba and the meaning of Cuba to the MLB.
This section starts recalling Mark Rosentraub's remark : "Sports are but a very small fraction of the global economy or even the economy of any major city, but they have been and remain fundamental components of life in many societies." (Rosentraub 2000, 123) In the specific case of baseball this is true both for the United States and Cuba. Major League Baseball is closely monitoring the White House's announcement regarding Cuban-American relations. While there are not sufficient details to make a realistic evaluation, we will continue to track this significant issue, and we will keep our Clubs informed if this different direction may impact the manner in which they conduct business on issues related to Cuba. (USA Today 2014).
The thaw with Cuba seems perfect for the MLB. Its Commissioner, Rob Manfred, said that the League seeks to expand beyond the current borders, and Cuba is one of the countries that are under consideration for this expansion. Manfred said during the Florida Marlins spring training camp: "We are in conversations with the [U.S.] government about Cuba" (Spencer 2015) . He added: "Cuba is a great market for us in two ways. Obviously it's a great talent market.
[And] it's a country where baseball is embedded in the culture." (Spencer 2015) . In addition, Manfred does not rule out taking the World Baseball Classic to Cuba.
Baseball's lobbying evolution in Washington.
In the pluralist decision making schemes, generally the state does not act independently of social groups, although it preserves some autonomy. As Mingst observes:
Societal groups have a variety of ways of forcing decisions in their favor or constraining choices. They can mobilize the media and public opinion, lobby the government agencies responsible for making the decision, influence the appropriate representative bodies [...] organize transnational networks of people with comparable interests, and, in the case of high-profile heads of multinational corporations, make direct contacts with the highest governmental officials. The decision made will reflect these diverse societal interests and strategies -a result that is particularly compatible with liberal thinking (Mingst 2004, 127) .
One of the typical forms of dialogue, representation, pressure and exercise of influence by interest groups is lobbying. MLB is no stranger to such practices. This section will briefly deal with the evolution of MLB lobbying. on the other hand, the fact that in 1998, the Congress had passed the Curt Flood Act, which partially lifted baseball's exceptions to anti-trust laws, and which gave baseball players the same labor protections that other professional athletes enjoyed, reduced the need of a strong presence in Washington (Moore 2000) .
At that time, baseball was the sport that spent more money on lobbying in Washington.
According to the Federal Election Commission, a group in Washington that tracks spending on campaigns and lobbying, the MLB spent around $880 000 USD on lobbying during the first half of 1999, which was more than the combined of the other U.S. professional leagues (quoted in Moore 2000) .
Despite the MLB's decision to close its Washington lobbying office and/or subcontract lobbying, instead of having its own specialized office, Moore notes that the growing flow of players from Latin America and Asia, turn immigration issues (and we may add, foreign policy in general) into a concern for baseball. Just as baseball has opposed some Senate's efforts to limit tax-free funding for the construction of new sports venues (Moore 2000) , today U.S. foreign policy can rekindle the need for lobbying by the MLB. In this regard,
Michael Schmidt observes:
Generally, important announcements from Washington foreign policy do not generate reactions from the office of the Commissioner of baseball and the players Union; however, after Obama message there were concise statements, claiming that they were monitoring the situation issued to the nation on Wednesday (Schmidt 2014 ).
In 2001 Meanwhile, William DeWitt, co-owner of the St. Louis Cardinals, was one of the contributing pioneers to the campaign of George W. Bush, gathering more than $100 000 USD (Mullins 2002) . All this demonstrates that there is an existing link between sports and politics. As Jerry Colangelo observes: "In today's world, the political climate is relevant to how we conduct our business, and therefore it's important to be well represented in
Washington." (quoted in Mullins 2002 Mullins , 2008 . Mullins also explains that not only the owners and the executive authorities of the MLB have resorted to lobbying, but the players Union has done the same.
This section concludes with a remark from Commissioner Manfred:
To the extent that we can play a role in helping the United States government effectuate a change in policy, that we're following their lead and we're acting in a way that's consistent with what they want us to do, that's an honor for us (Cfr. Costa 2015).
Various implications of the normalization of Cuba-United States diplomatic relations for baseball and its stakeholders.
The implications that could arise from the normalization of the diplomatic relations U.S.-Cuba, for both baseball and the involved actors and stakeholders, are the focus of analysis in this section. The implications are legal and economic. Individuals, teams, leagues (not only the Cuban and the U.S.) but other leagues such as the Mexican, Canadian, Japanese, the Taiwanese league, among others, are conditioned and impacted by the status of the bilateral inter-state U.S.-Cuba relationship. A plethora of actors, stakeholders, and interests will be impacted, for good or ill, by the normalization of the bilateral relationship.
If we bear in mind the globalization of the economy, baseball could have great relevance
because it could/it should imply harmonization tendencies, equal competition within markets, as well as an increased respect for human rights. In this respect, Marcano and Fidler's (1999) work is important because it points out to the existence of unequal conditions, almost always unfavorable for Latin baseball players. Marcano and Fidler (1999) have drawn analogies with other multinational corporations which tend to treat foreign workers in a more unfavorable way in relation to the treatment that national workers get. In the specific case of Cuban players, a normalization of the bilateral relations, would open a horizon for the promotion of human rights and labor standards, when a truly competitive and fair market is in place.
Under the current embargo against Cuba, players from that country must establish residency in a third country before signing with a MLB team. That has led to a tortuous path for many players before joining the MLB (Costa 2015) . For many Cuban players, including superstars such as Yasiel Puig and Yoenis Cespedes 5 , the departure from Cuba has required smuggling networks and/or the establishment of residency in a third country (Mexico and the Dominican Republic, respectively), so that they are able to maximize their income by avoiding the draft (Beaton and Miller 2014) . For decades there has been a strong defection of Cuban players. Some of them defected while playing overseas with the Cuban national team, but others risked their lives, putting their lives in the hands of smugglers. The story of Yasiel Puig is particularly dramatic. He left Cuba and was exposed to crocodile-infested waters, before being captured by part of the Mexican organized crime, which threatened to cut off his arm (Sánchez 2014). Scott Price (2014) observed that behind every story of multimillion dollar contracts of a Cuban baseball player, there is almost always the negative part of the story: wives and children who remain in Cuba. All this could radically change with the normalization of the bilateral relations.
Presently, U.S. policy toward Cuban migrants, argues that any Cuban who reaches
American soil is eligible for asylum, but those who are intercepted at sea are repatriated. This policy is known as "wet foot / dry foot". Such a contradiction has encouraged smuggling and the activity of organized crime (Arango 2007) . When a Cuban baseball player decides to defect, it must deal with two sets of arbitrary rules: dry feet policy and the regulations related to the signing of foreign players. Just as it happens with U.S. immigration policy, the MLB stance toward Cuban players is sui generis: any Cuban player who comes to the United States is considered to be a resident, and therefore has to be recruited through the draft. All the other foreign players are considered free agents and can sign with the highest bidder (Arango 2007) . Solomon (2011) considered that Cuban players, as any other foreign players, should be treated as a free agents, rather than forcing them de facto become a deserter. Cubans are treated differently in at least the following points: a) Cubans who want to play in the United
States must de facto become deserters; b) they must renounce their Cuban nationality; c) they are subject to the Kuhn Directive, which as amended in 1991, prohibits the negotiation with anyone in Cuba in relation to the signing of any player in Cuban territory; d) a Cuban Player is required to establish residency in another country in order to be able to play in the MLB (Solomon 2011) .
The implications of the normalization in the relationship could have repercussions (positive or negative) for different groups: criminal groups, for the owners, as well as for baseball's labor market. Ortiz considers that on the one side, the trips to the United States could be less dangerous; on the other hand, astronomical contracts such as Puig's ($42 million) and Abreu's ($68 million) would be more difficult in the future (Ortiz 2014) . The ease of Cuban players making it to the MLB would force salaries downwards, but for the MLB and its teams, it would represent an increased profitability. Solomon (2011) The problem does not lie in the question of whether baseball is a useful tool or not within the normalization of the international and transnational U.S.-Cuba relations. As we can see in this paper, there is a significant amount of news related to baseball that were published within a short time after Obama's announcement in December 2014. The heart of the matter is that many of the voices in favor of using baseball as a diplomatic tool, are based on a speech in which the beneficiaries would be only the MLB and the Cuban baseball players.
Implicitly or explicitly there is a dominating view that the only loser would be Fidel Castro.
If the new approach is a reset-like approach leading into a normalization of the relations, it is unfortunate and dangerous to imply that the ultima ratio of the normalization of the relations is a regime change. This would not only lead back to realism, but it will blockade the viability of the baseball diplomacy. Perhaps a variable-sum game solution could be that the Cuban team and/or the Cuban League could post its players in a similar way in which the Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) does with its Japanese players. Taking into account the market price and the quality of the players, it should not be a problem to give greater dynamism to baseball, including the regulated flow of players. Certainly, both the MLB and the economy of Cuban teams would benefit through a "fair trade" of players, not to mention the invaluable gains in terms of human rights and security. According to Ben Badler (2014), a viable solution from the Cuban point of view would be based on two premises: 1) the National Series must remain up and running, and function properly, and 2) the Cuban government should get money for itself as part of the negotiation process.
Although states should not monopolize the various international relationships, it should be guaranteed that each state, according to its degree of development and interests, gets sufficient incentives to cooperate, and in the case of U.S.-Cuba normalization, challenge the status quo that lasted several decades.
Culture is an important post-realist factor. Certainly, culture will not replace high politics in interstate relations; however, my bet is that culture could serve as a sort of spark plug, as a catalyst for areas of convergence, understanding, common languages, and common interests. Perhaps in so far as issues are fun for people, as issues are part of their national identities, cultural issues could positively serve as spaces and areas of understanding. These cultural forms, having legal, economic, and political implications can pave the way in other areas.
Solomon (2011) Solomon goes beyond baseball: "Altering the current Cuban baseball policy has the potential of effecting U.S.-Cuban relations as a whole" (Solomon 2011, 186 counted on a similar US fan base as it did in the case of China. In contrast, baseball is wellknown as the pastime of both countries, Cuba and United States.
According to Andrés Schipani (2011) , the baseball diplomacy promoted by Clinton and interrupted during George W. Bush-era, has a great potential. Schipani believes that sport contacts are positive because they encourage dialogue from people to people, groups to groups and cultures to cultures (as opposed to the fruitless dialogue between state and state).
It is not unreasonable then to believe that the approach in a specific cultural area such as baseball, fully understood, shared and cherished in both countries, is an area of opportunity that could contribute to the questioning, challenging, and dismantling of anachronistic interests and identities, and at least gives the opportunity to experiment if the tenets or hopes of constructivism can be an option, a viable alternative to realpolitik. Alexander Wendt (2009) proposed that the interests and identities of leaders are fundamental to understanding the interactions between states. The position in this work is slightly different: the interests of individuals and associations, in a specific cultural-economic domain, have the potential to alter the collective identities. At the same time, these communities, identities, and interests with transformed identities, could redefine state identities, which would necessarily impact on interests which have until very recently been considered "fixed."
Conclusions
The announcement of President Obama on December 2014 and the opening of embassies in mid-2015 opened hope for the transformation of "the" bilateral relationship; the present paper, however, argues that the only possibility for a qualitative change in "the" relationship lies in the multiplication of the (transnational) international relations established by individuals and organizations from both countries.
As it was the case with table tennis diplomacy, which proved to be an effective catalyst for a new understanding between the United States and China, this paper has argued, that baseball can be an even better catalyst to cement a constructivist approach that allows for relations and transnational flows to flourish in a cultural sector, which is understood and appreciated by individuals and groups from both countries. Meanwhile, almost 14 months after "the announcement", there are promising hints that baseball is already playing its part in the normalization of the bilateral relationship: the December 2015, three-day goodwill tour of Cuba by a group of MLB players, which included defectors such as Yasiel Puig, José
Abreu, Alexei Ramírez, and Brayan Peña, is considered an important first step .
The other promising step is the announcement that the Tampa Bay Rays will play an exhibition game in Havana against the Cuban National Team on March 22, 2016 (Topkin 2016 ). The easing, normalization, legalization, and ultimately, the strengthening of the baseball links between non-state actors from both countries could be the triggering example for other economic, social and political actors.
Indeed, the fact that MLB made a series of statements in the hours following Obama's announcement is a promising sign that there is an objective interest in this League in the normalization of the bilateral relations. The course that the bilateral political relationship takes will influence positively or negatively diverse domains surrounding baseball: it will impact the profitability of the MLB, it will impact organized crime, currently involved in the flow of Cuban baseball players. However, one can also grasp the opposite direction: the needs and interests of the non-state actors involved in the baseball world, may exert sufficient pressure to transform the political relationship.
In conclusion, it is necessary to clarify that it is not the intention of the author to prognosticate the replacement of realism. Nonetheless, the novelty, and where the hope of baseball diplomacy lies, is that this constructivist approach could open a parallel route to the realist approach, a route which could develop and strengthen transnational relations of cooperation and benefit for individuals and non-state organizations.
